• The Lanthus Tele-Phane/Vid-Link distance-conferencing proposal
• The Lanthus Sky-Hook stepped-orbit space-launch facility proposal
• The Lanthus Aero-Space Traffic LASTCommand proposal

IRIDIUM SALVAGE: (2000-2001)

As the world faces increasingly complex and higher technology systems failures at the economic level, the imperative to save these systems becomes cost-and-budget effective: Such systems need not be obsolete but by their immense size have taken-on such appearance as worries significantly more political-budget strategists so requiring executive level command-shoring to secure and restore near-original operations. Oftimes this is little more than upgrading the client by upgrading the concept potential. Gone are the days of efficacious 17-year patents, despite the US Congressional contrarity legally lengthening these to 20 years: Industrial competitions in the higher technologies upgrade annually, and new technologies supersede contemporaries in five.

The recently scheduled demise of USA multi-vestee Iridium CORP's 66 [designated 77] Satellite Digital-Telephony Constellation, supplies an example:

Iridium's original purpose was to serve a vast client-base of (27 million) personally mobile users, but as the electronics technology progressed rapidly (as was in fact well-known and near-predictable) during the years-long development and implementation phases, the diminishing costs of component replacement and through-put upgrades, without corroborative planned system bandwidth flexibility, precipitated an attitude of system economics failure: it became apparent the system could be out-run by building new systems in the contemporary frame - which newer large systems are suffering similar throes: Gone are the days of efficacious 17-year patents, despite the US Congressional contrarity which legally lengthened these to 20 years. The solution we found at and for Lanthus to take-over the Iridium system, was simply that, as personal telephony had indeed become deregulatedly inexpensive and proliferative, both cellular and satellite, in the matched-market, predominantly USA-EURO, so that these others became first-buy, and the Iridium prospects became delayed by both component-service cost preemption and market match subduction (meaning, buyers centralize and wait for the less-well-matched coverage to be eventually picked-up by their first-buy choice) and seemed to investors to have foundered in its intent.

This becomes more common as large infrastructured government-like systems develop on the higher technologies: We at NEMO are concerned for GNSC Fleet obsolescence: The sedentary tendency of poor grade economics in the USA-EURO matched-market has solutions, too, but the greater concern is to educate this market to desire to hold to its potential progress: an education failing before self-styled agencies-of-change budget-lopping at the top-technologists, leaving the lesser groping for direction: a simple armageddon of addiction-confidence-dependency self-subsidence, that can be effectually resolved only by proving the gain of better education, as should have been: education should have thrown-off the age-old pollutions manifestly infesting the national college campuses: the concern for the future is that the solution should not remain so unspeakable before the ploy of the same counter-agency, as the unworthy-of-askance pollutions themselves: a Christ-potent scenario.

Our solution for Iridium was simply to upgrade the client from personal to in situ congregational: the air transport industry promontorily has needed the upgrade to live digital data-base command and communication for decades (we foresaw in the late '70's), and Iridium still has adequate bandwidth to solve this need, for effectually the same number of end-users: merely congregated in 500's on jumbo aircraft.

Lanthus claim on Iridium

The Iridium Satellite system, itself being space-based, precludes significant component salvage, and therefore outside the scope and intents of the usual Bankruptcy and Salvage Laws and Rules of the Sea and Land - the base-end equipment salvage would be impossible at any ordinary, even if large, price. But the system itself is not malfunctioning, but is not financially supported - the sole reason for the demise of the venture: thus there is no salvage in the usual sense of inoperable assets available for scrap value - the major equipment is not in scrap condition, and is not inexpensively retrievable: two conditions for permitting legal salvage and repossession where no previous contract existed.

Therefore it is deemed reasonable to question whether any salvage is possible, and just how much, should be salvaged, and what is the fair price to pay for this high-end-only right. Lanthus proposed that as it could salvage at the system level, by restoring the entire system to full function and benefit, and by keeping the original staffs, equipments, with standard maintain replacements and upgrades, and that any price Lanthus could offer, if not exceeded by group proposing at least as much thoroughness in salvage, should succeed to permit.

Again: Any other large offer for however slightly but significantly less recovery in salvage, has no reason for being, inasmuch as the lesser salvages were disqualified by the conditions explained. Therefor Lanthus has deemed itself legal and palpable interest, and its offer of $1 sufficed its purpose and legality.

Lanthus Surrogate Accessions Management